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Abstract
We provide a refoundation of the symmetric growth equilibrium character-
izing the research sector of vertical R&D-driven growth models. We argue that
the usual assumptions made in this class of models leave the agents indi¤erent
as to where targeting research: hence, the problem of the allocation of R&D in-
vestment across sectors is indeterminate. By introducing an " contamination
of condence in the expected distribution of R&D investment, we prove that
the symmetric structure of R&D investment is the unique rational expectations
equilibrium compatible with ambiguity-averse agents adopting a maximin strat-
egy.
Keywords: R&D-Driven Growth Models, Indeterminacy, Ambiguity, " contamination.
JEL Classication: 032, 041, D81.
1 Introduction
Most vertical R&D-driven growth models (such as Grossman-Helpman [9], Segerstrom
[12], Aghion-Howitt [1]) focus on the symmetric equilibrium in the research sector, that
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is, on that path characterized by an equal size of R&D investment in each industry.
In these models the engine of growth is technological progress, which stems from R&D
investment decisions taken by prot-maximizing agents. By means of research, each
product line can be improved an innite number of times, and the rms manufacturing
the most updated version of a product monopolize the relative market and thus earn
positive prots. These prots have a temporary nature since any monopolistic producer
is doomed to be displaced by successive improvements in its product line. The level
of expected prots together with their expected duration, as compared to the cost of
research, determines the protability of undertaking R&D in each line.
The plausibility of the symmetric equilibrium requires that each R&D industry be
equally protable, so that the agents happen to be indi¤erent as to where targeting
their investment (Grossman and Helpman [9], p.47). The prot-equality requirement
implies two di¤erent conditions. First, the prot ows deriving from any innovation
need to be the same for each industry: this is guaranteed by assuming that all the
monopolistic industries share the same cost and demand conditions. Second, the mo-
nopolistic position acquired by innovating needs to be expected to last equally long
across sectors: this requires that the agents expect the future amount of research to be
equally distributed among the di¤erent sectors. As is well known to the reader famil-
iar with the neo-Schumpeterian models of growth, future is allowed to a¤ect current
(investment) decisions via the forward-looking nature of the Schumpeterian creative
destructione¤ect.
Expecting equal future protability across sectors, however, does not constitute a
su¢ cient condition for each agent to choose a symmetric allocation of R&D e¤orts:
indeed, equal future protability makes the investor indi¤erent as to where target-
ing research. As a result, when symmetric expectations are assumed the allocation
problem of investment across product lines is indeterminate. First, notice that this
indeterminacy in the intersectoral allocation of R&D may have powerful e¤ects on the
equilibrium growth rate in this class of models, as recently pointed out by Cozzi [3,4].
Second, indeterminacy does not depend on the focus on the symmetric equilibrium. In
a recent paper1 Giordani and Zamparelli develop an extension of the standard quality-
ladder model to an economy with asymmetric fundamentals where the equilibrium
allocation of R&D investment turns out to be asymmetric. However, the multiplic-
ity of equilibria still exists, because the source of indeterminacy is not the symmetric
1P. Giordani and L. Zamparelli (2006), The Importance of Industrial Policy in the Quality Ladder
Growth Models, Mimeo.
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structure of the economy but the fact that, in equilibrium, the returns from R&D are
equalized, which still characterizes the asymmetric extension and which, once again,
makes the agents indi¤erent in the allocation of R&D e¤orts.
In this paper we provide a way to eliminate indeterminacy in this class of models.
Our reasoning goes as follows: the agentsindi¤erence - arising from the equalization
of R&D returns across industries - gives them in principle the possibility of adopting a
whatever (even randomly chosen) investment strategy. This makes these agents highly
uncertain about the conguration of future R&D investment, since that conguration
is the result of a decision problem analogous to the one they are currently facing. To
represent uncertainty (or ambiguity) and the agents attitude towards it, we follow
the maxmin expected utility (MEU) theory axiomatized by Gilboa and Schmeidler
[8]. In representing subjective beliefs this approach suggests to replace the standard
single (additive) prior with a closed and convex set of (additive) priors. The choice
among alternative acts is determined via a maximin strategy, where the minimization
is carried out over the set of priors and is meant to represent the individualsaversion
towards ambiguous scenarios. The plausibility of individualsaversion to ambiguity (or
preference for pure risk) has been rst shown by Ellsberg [6] via a thought experiment
(then known as the Ellsberg paradox)2. In particular, we follow the " contamination
of condenceargument, recently axiomatized by Nishimura and Ozaki [11]. As we will
see, a however small contamination of condence in the expectations of the future
investmentallocation annihilates the agentsindi¤erence and makes the conguration
where R&D returns are equalized across industries emerge as the unique equilibrium.
Importantly, our assumption on the agentsattitude towards uncertainty does not
concern any fundamental of the economy and is to be interpreted as a way of treat-
ing extrinsic uncertainty. Moreover, uncertainty does not a¤ect expectations on the
aggregate amount of research. In fact, we introduce uncertainty to eliminate inde-
terminacy arising from situations where agents are indi¤erent among a set of choices.
This is not the case for the total amount of research: if agents expect the equilibrium
aggregate amount of research, their choice between consumption and savings, which
are channelled to the research sector, is uniquely determined and conrms their expec-
tations; there is no indi¤erence, which is the source of the uncertainty in the agents
beliefs. Hence, in order to develop our argument all we need is the description of the
2Abundant experimental evidence supports the idea of the decision-makersambiguity aversion.
See among the others Heath and Tversky [10], Fox and Tversky [7]. See also Camerer and Weber [2]
for a survey.
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R&D sector.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we briey describe the
basic structure of the R&D sector, with particular reference to the Segerstroms [12]
formalization3. In Section 3 we explain the core of our argument, enunciate and prove
the proposition.
2 The R&D Sector
In this Section we provide a description of the vertical innovation sector, which is basi-
cally common to most neo-Schumpeterian growth models. This sector is characterized
by the e¤orts of R&D rms aimed at developing better versions of the existing prod-
ucts in order to displace the current monopolists. We assume a continuum of industries
indexed by ! over the interval [0; 1]. There are free entry and perfect competition in
each R&D race. Firms employ labor and produce, through a constant returns tech-
nology, a Poisson arrival rate of innovation in the product line they target. Adopting
Segerstroms [12] notation, any rm j hiring lj units of labor in industry ! at time t
acquires the instantaneous probability of innovating Alj=X(!; t), where X(!; t) is the
industry-specic R&D di¢ culty index.
Since independent Poisson processes are additive, the specication of the innova-
tion process implies that the industry-wide instantaneous probability of innovation is
ALI(!; t)=X(!; t)  I(!; t), where LI(!; t) =
P
j lj(!; t). The function X(!; t) de-
scribes the evolution of technology; as in Segerstrom [12], we assume it to evolve in
accordance with: 
X(!; t)
X(!; t)
= I(!; t)
where  is a positive constant. Then, by substituting for I(!; t) into the expression
above and solving the di¤erential equation for X(!; t) we get:
X(!; t) = X(!; t0) + A
tR
t0
LI(!; z)dz:
Whenever a rm succeeds in innovating, it acquires the uncertain prot ow that
accrues to a monopolist, that is, the stock market valuation of the rm: let us denote
it by v(!; t). Thus, the problem faced by an R&D rm is that of choosing the amount
of labor input in order to maximize its expected prots4:
3Notice however that our argument can be applied, mutatis mutandis, to the whole class of models.
4As usual, let us consider labor as the numeraire.
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max
lj
[v(!; t)Alj=X(!; t)  lj];
which provides a nite, positive solution for lj only when the arbitrage equation
v(!; t)A=X(!; t) = 1 is satised. Notice that in this case, though nite, the size of the
rm is indeterminate because of the constant returns research technology5.
The rms market valuation at a given instant t, v(!; t), is the expected discounted
value of its prot ows from t to +1:
v(!; t) =
+1R
t
(s) exp

 
sR
t
[r() + I(!; )] d

ds:
By plugging I(!; ) into v(!; t), we nally obtain the following expression for v(!; t):
v(!; t) =
+1R
t
(s) exp
8>>><>>>: 
sR
t
26664r() + ALI(!; )
X(!; t0) + A
R
t0
LI(!; z)dz
37775 d
9>>>=>>>; ds: (1)
The usual focus on the symmetric growth equilibrium is based on the assumption
that the R&D intensity I(!; ) is the same in all industries ! and strictly positive.
The suggestion of a new rationale for this symmetric behavior is the topic of the next
Section.
3 The Refoundation of the Symmetric Equilibrium
Assume that the agent is (1 p)100% sure to face in the future a symmetric congura-
tion of R&D investment, and that with probability p any other possible conguration
can occur. We can call this situation a p contamination of condence6. Aversion
to uncertainty in this context implies that with probability p the agent expects the
5In the next Section our focus will be on the individualsinvestment decisions, the reason being
that R&D rms are actually nanced by consumerssavings, which are channeled to them through
the nancial market. Thus the role of these rms is merely that of transforming these savings into
research activity.
6To avoid confusion let us remark that in the literature this situation is usually called
" contamination (which is also the phrase used in the Introduction). However, as we will see, in
our context " stands for the extension of the state space.
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worst conguration of future investment, that is, the one which minimizes her expected
returns7. Since the minimizing conguration is a function of the agents investment
choice, this choice can then be formalized as the result of a two-player zero-sum game
characterized by:
 the minimizing behavior of a malevolent Nature, which selects the worst pos-
sible conguration of future R&D e¤orts and
 the maximizing behavior of the agent, who selects the best possible conguration
of current R&D e¤orts.
We start our analysis at the beginning of time t = t0, and assume that, at this
time, all industries share the same di¢ culty index X(!; t0) = X(t0) 8! 2 [0; 1] in
order to focus on the role of expectations on the kind of equilibrium that will prevail.
Our problem can then be stated as follows. At time t = t0, the agent is asked to
allocate a certain amount of R&D investment among all the existing industries: in
maximizing her expected pay-o¤, she will take into account the minimizing strategy
that a malevolent Naturewill be carrying out in choosing the composition of future
R&D e¤orts. We denote with lm(!; t0)  lm(t0)[1 + (!)] the agents investment in
sector ! at time t0, and with LI(!; t)  LI(t)[1 + "(!)] the agents expectations about
the aggregate research in sector ! at a generic point in time t. lm(t0) and LI(t) are,
respectively, the agents average investment per sector at t0 and the expected average
research per sector at a generic t. "() and () represent relative deviations from these
averages satisfying:
1Z
0
"(!)d! = 0;
1Z
0
(!)d! = 0 and "(!)   1; (!)   1:
7See the representation theorem (theorem 1) in Nishimura and Ozaki [11] for an axiomatization of
the choice behavior assumed here.
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The presence of the two functions () and "() is intended to allow for asymmetry in
the agents current and expected investment8 9. Note that () and "() are unbounded
above because the zero-measure of each sector allows the investment in any of them to
be however big, without violating the constraint on the total R&D investment. From
now on we will drop the argument t0 in the expression for10 lm(!; t0) and enunciate the
following:
Proposition 1 For a however small probability (p) of deviation ("(!)) from symmet-
ric expectations on the future R&D investment, decision makers adopting a maxmin
strategy to solve their investment allocation problem, choose a symmetric investment
strategy, i.e. lm[1 + (!)] = lm 8! 2 [0; 1]. The associated distribution of expected
R&D e¤orts among sectors is: LI(t)[1 + "(!)] = LI(t) 8! 2 [0; 1].
Proof. If we substitute for LI(!; t)  LI(t)[1 + "(!)] into (1), and use the condition
1R
0
(!)d! = 0, our problem can be stated as:
max
()
8>><>>:(1  p)lm
A
X(t0)
+1R
t0
(s) exp
2664  sR
t0
0BB@r() + ALI()
X(t0)+A
R
t0
LI(z)dz
1CCA d
3775 ds +
+pmin
"()
1Z
0
lm[1 + (!)]
A
X(t0)
8>><>>:
+1R
t0
(s) exp
2664  sR
t0
0BB@r() + ALI()[1+"(!)]
X(t0)+A
R
t0
LI(z)[1+"(!)]dz
1CCA d
3775 ds
9>>=>>; d!
9>>=>>;
8These denitions imply:
1R
0
LI(t)[1 + " (!)]d! = LI(t) = L(t)
1R
0
lm(t)[1 +  (!)]d! = L(t)lm(t)
where L(t) denotes the mass of agents in the economy at time t. With reference to Section 2 the
following relation between lj and lm holds:
1R
0
P
j lj (!; t) d! = L(t)lm(t):
9As in the standard quality-ladder models, here the agent is still assumed to be risk-averse, and
to able to completely diversify her portfolio - by means of the intermediation of costless nancial
institutions. In fact, in order to carry out this diversication, it is su¢ cient to allocate investments
in a non-zero measure interval of R&D sectors (and not necessarily in the whole of them), according
to a measure that is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure of the sector space.
Ambiguity here a¤ects the mean return of the R&D investment and not its volatility, against which
the agent has already completely hedged.
10As we show below, this does not result in any loss of generality.
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s:t:
1Z
0
"(!)d! = 0;
1Z
0
(!)d! = 0;
(!) 2 [ 1;1); "(!) 2 [ 1;1):
Notice that the rst addend of the maximand is constant with respect to () and
"(), so that it does not a¤ect the solution of the problem.
This problem admits the same solution for a however small probability p. In order
to prove that the unique equilibrium is given by (!) = "(!) = 0 8! 2 [0; 1], we will
proceed through the following steps (the reader can refer to Figure 1, where c1,c2,c3,c4
represent the agents pay-o¤s).
1. We will rst prove that, if the agent plays a symmetric strategy, (!) = 0
8! 2 [0; 1], then the worst harm Nature can inict to the agent is also associated with
a symmetric strategy, "(!) = 0 8! 2 [0; 1] (that is, with reference to Figure 1: c1 < c2).
2. We will then prove that, if Nature chooses "(!) = 0 8! 2 [0; 1], the pay-o¤ the
agent will obtain is independent of her investment strategy (that is, c1 = c3).
3. We will nally show that, if the agent plays an asymmetric strategy, (!) 6= 0
in a non-zero measure set, then the worst harm Nature can inict to the agent is also
associated with an asymmetric strategy, "(!) 6= 0 in a non-zero measure set (with
reference to Figure 1: c4 < c3).
Then the conguration given by (!) = "(!) = 0 8! 2 [0; 1] will emerge as the
unique equilibrium of the zero-sum game (since c2 > c1 = c3 > c4). Let us proceed
step by step.
1. (c1 < c2). If (!) = 0 8! 2 [0; 1], we rst show that the function:
 
1Z
0
lm
8>><>>:
+1R
t0
(s) exp
2664  sR
t0
0BB@r() + ALI()[1+"(!)]
X(t0)+A
R
t0
LI(z)[1+"(!)]dz
1CCA d
3775 ds
9>>=>>; d!
is a sum over ! of strictly convex functions in "(!). In fact, set:
f("; )   
0BB@r() + ALI()[1+"(!)]
X(t0)+A
R
t0
LI(z)[1+"(!)]dz
1CCA
8
Figure 1: The Game between the Agent and Nature
Since
@2f("; )
@"2
> 0, then f("; ) is strictly convex11. As a result, the function
F ("; s) 
sR
t0
f("; )d , as a sum of strictly convex functions, is also strictly convex,
that is:
@2F ("; s)
@"2
> 0. Now, for each s 2 [t0;+1], we can dene: H("; s) 
lm(s) exp [F ("; s)]. H("; s) is also strictly convex, being a positive transformation
of the exponential of a strictly convex function; and so it is the sum of all H("; s) over
t 2 [t0;+1). Finally, ("(!)) =
1R
0
+1R
t0
H("; s)dsd! 
1R
0
G("(!))d! is a sum over ! of
continuous and strictly convex functions, G(), of ". Notice that () is an operator
transforming measurable real functions into real numbers, whereas H() and G() are
functions transforming real numbers into real numbers.
Let 0() be the function that is identically equal to zero, i.e. 0(!) = 0 for all
! 2 [0; 1]. We want to show that the minimum value of () occurs when "() = 0(),
that is, when "(!) = 0, 8! 2 [0; 1].
Let !1 = 1N , !2 =
2
N
,..., !N = 1, with N > 0 being an integer number. By
denition of convexity we have:
G(1"(!1)+2"(!2)+ ::+N"(!N))  1G("(!1))+2G ("(!2))+ ::+NG ("(!N)) ;
11It is
@2f("; )
@"2
=
2A2LI()X(t0)
R 
t0
LI(z)dz
A(1+"(!))
R 
t0
LI(z)dz+X(t0)
3 > 0 as "(!)   1:
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with
PN
i=1 i = 1. Let us posit 1 = 2 = :: = N = 1=N , then we have:
G
XN
i=1
"(!i)
1
N

 1
N
XN
i=1
G ("(!i)) :
By the continuity of G() and the denition of integral, it is:
lim
N!1
G
XN
i=1
"(!i)
1
N

= G
0@ 1Z
0
"(!)d!
1A  lim
N!1
1
N
XN
i=1
G ("(!i)) =
1Z
0
G("(!))d!:
Noting that
1R
0
"(!)d! = 0 and that
1R
0
G(0)d! = G (0) it follows that:
(0()) =
1Z
0
G
Z 1
0
"(!)d!

d! = G (0) 
1Z
0
G("(!))d! = ("(!))
for all measurable functions "(). This implies that "() = 0() is the minimizing
conguration of " satisfying
1R
0
"(!)d! = 0: The pay-o¤, obtained by setting "(!) =
(!) = 0 8! 2 [0; 1] in  is then the one that the agent can surely obtain if she plays
a symmetric strategy.
2. (c1 = c3). If "(!) = 0, 8! 2 [0; 1], then the agent would be totally indi¤erent in
the allocation of her R&D e¤orts. In fact, the maximum problem obtained by setting
"(!) = 0 8! 2 [0; 1] is (under the usual constraints):
max
()
1Z
0
lm[1 + (!)]
+1R
t0
(s) exp
2664  sR
t0
0BB@r() + ALI()
X(t0)+A
R
t0
LI(z)dz
1CCA d
3775 dsd!;
which, since
1R
0
(!)d! = 0, always gives the same constant value:
lm
+1R
t0
(s) exp
2664  sR
t0
0BB@r() + ALI()
X(t0)+A
R
t0
LI(z)dz
1CCA d
3775 ds:
3. (c4 < c3). Assume (!) 6= 0 for some non zero measure set of ! 2 [0; 1]. Then
the Natures minimum problem with respect to "() can be stated as follows:
min
"()
1Z
0
lm[1 + (!)]
8>><>>:
+1R
t0
(s) exp
2664  sR
t0
0BB@r() + ALI()[1+"(!)]
X(t0)+A
R
t0
LI(z)[1+"(!)]dz
1CCA d
3775 ds
9>>=>>; d!
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s:t:
1Z
0
"(!)d! = 0
The solution to this problem is "[(!)], which is the reaction function of Nature,
that is, its optimal (minimizing) response to any possible value of (!). We do not
need, however, to nd it explicitly since our conclusion follows straightforwardly. We
can build the Lagrangian and then derive the rst-order conditions (f.o.c.):
L =
1Z
0
lm[1+(!)]
8>><>>:
+1R
t0
(s) exp
2664  sR
t0
0BB@r() + ALI()[1+"(!)]
X(t0)+A
R
t0
LI(z)[1+"(!)]dz
1CCA d
3775 ds
9>>=>>; d!+
1Z
0
"(!)d!
For every ! 2 [0; 1], the f.o.c. with respect to " are:
lm[1 + (!)]
+1R
t0
(s) exp
2664  sR
t0
0BB@r() + ALI()[1+"(!)]
X(t0)+A
R
t0
LI(z)[1+"(!)]dz
1CCA d
3775 ds

"
 
sR
t0
ALI()X(t0)
X(t0)+A(1+"(!))
R 
t0
LI(z)dz
2d
#
=  
It results that, if (!) 6= 0 for some ! 2 [0; 1], and if the constraint
1R
0
(!)d! = 0
holds, the necessary conditions for a minimum can never be satised if "[(!)] = 0
8! 2 [0; 1]12.
The intuition of the result is as follows. Under symmetric expectations (" = 0) the
agent is indi¤erent as to where targeting her investment (c1 = c3); this has been the
starting point of our paper. The agent also knows that, when investing symmetrically,
the corresponding pay-o¤ (c1) is also the minimum that she can obtain: in fact, if
future investment turns out to be asymmetric (" 6= 0) she will be better o¤ (c2 > c1)
given the convexity of the pay-o¤ function in ". On the contrary, when allocating
investment asymmetrically ( 6= 0), even with a slight probability (p! 0) that a future
non-symmetric distribution will arise (" 6= 0), our agent will expect to be targeting
above average exactly those sectors that will subsequently experience above average
innovative e¤orts, thus lowering the expected payo¤ as compared to the symmetric
investment case (c4 < c3). As a result, since the worst that can happen while investing
12In fact, consider an economy with only two sectors, !1,!2. If it were "(!1) = "(!2) = 0, the
satisfaction of the f.o.c. and the constraint would require (!1) = (!2) and (!1) + (!2) = 0,
which proves that there cannot exist ! where (!) 6= 0:
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symmetrically (c1) is always better than the worst that can happen while choosing a
(whatever) asymmetric allocation of investment (c4), our cautiousagent will always
strictly prefer the rst option.
Notice that the fact that the symmetric equilibrium is being derived at the beginning
of time t = t0 does not result in any loss of generality. In fact, this equilibrium
guarantees that the di¢ culty index X(!; t) starts growing at the same rate - and is
therefore always equal - across sectors. This condition in turn assures that, at any
point in time t, the agent continuously faces a decision problem equivalent to the one
we have analyzed and, hence, continuously nds the same optimal (symmetric) solution.
Notice also that our result holds even when the punishment powerof Nature ("(!))
is restricted to be however small. The proof is straightforward: given "(!) 2 [ ; ]
8 2 (0; 1), steps 1 and 2 of the proof are clearly una¤ected. For step 3 notice that
"(!) = 0 is always an inner point of the domain and, hence, the non-fulllment of the
f.o.c. guarantees that it is not a minimum.
We have shown that, even though the agent is almost sure(p ! 0) of facing a
symmetric conguration of future investment (which would leave her in a position of
indi¤erence in her current allocation problem), the mere possibility of a slightly di¤erent
conguration ("! 0) makes her strictly prefer to equally allocate her investment across
sectors. The symmetric equilibrium then emerges as the unique optimal investment
allocation.
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